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I. INTRODUCTION
On February 12, 2004, the American debate regarding the legaliza-
tion of same-sex marriage finally got personal. After years of
deliberations among academics, politicians, religious leaders, and activ-
ists, the American public received its first glimpse of what a same-sex
marriage looks like: two grandmotherly women in their early eighties,
gently hugging and pressing their wrinkled faces together. Phyllis Lyon
and Del Martin, founders of the Daughters of Bilitis, one of the first
lesbian rights organization in the United States,1 had been regarded by
supporters and foes alike as radical lesbian-feminists throughout their
many years of activism. By participating in society's most conventional
tradition, these women celebrated over fifty years of love and commit-
ment not only to one another, but also to the queer 2 rights movement.
SJ.D., University of Michigan Law School, expected 2006; A.B., Bryn Maur College,
2001.
1. WILLIAM N. ESKRIDGE, THE CASE FOR SAME-SEX MARRIAGE: FROM SEXUAL LIBERTY
TO CMLIZED COMMITMENT 57 (1996).
2. I use the term "queer" throughout this paper as an umbrella term to refer to lesbian,
gay, bisexual, and transgender individuals generally. The term also includes individu-
als who do not identify with any of those categories but who share romantic
relationships with people of the same gender. Of course, each of these separate com-
munities has its own unique concerns and brings its own challenges to the marriage
issue. For my purposes here, however, "queer" represents the broadest and most in-
clusive term possible.
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Like most weddings, Lyon and Martin's union was carefully
planned and orchestrated, but the details did not lie in the flavoring of
the cake or the seating arrangements of the guests. Rather, San Francisco
Mayor Gavin Newsom coordinated with constitutional scholars, gov-
ernment officials, and queer rights advocates to ensure that this
groundbreaking moment was cloaked in privacy. The wedding planners
wanted to prevent opponents from thwarting the ceremony,3 but after
issuing the marriage licenses, Mayor Newsom submitted a statement
and a photograph of the newlyweds to the press. The symbolic imagery
contained in those materials greatly impacted the nation. The queer
community immediately recognized Lyon and Martin as two of its own
heroes continuing the fight for equality. More importantly, the broader
public saw that same-sex marriage was no more threatening than two
elderly women holding hands. The date, February 12, represented
"Freedom to Marry Day," a day so named by queer rights activists sev-
eral years ago as a means to educate and build support for legalizing
same-sex marriages. Activists purposefully had chosen that date for its
proximity to the romantic holiday of St. Valentine's Day.
The images of Lyon and Martin's wedding personalized the same-
sex marriage debate in the eyes of the American public, but the Ameri-
can legal system had been dealing with this issue for years. Since the
Stonewall Riot in 1969, commonly regarded as the birth of the gay
rights movement,' numerous same-sex marriage cases have reached the
courts. The first such case was Baker v. Nelson5 in 1971, in which the
Minnesota Supreme Court affirmed the district attorney's refusal of a
marriage license to a male couple. Despite the plaintiffs' disappointing
loss, same-sex couples in other jurisdictions filed civil actions against
their municipal governments. All of these cases failed until Baehr v.
Lewin,6 in which the Hawaiian Supreme Court held that the state's de-
nial of, marriage, licenses to same-sex couples was sex discrimination
under the equal rights amendment to Hawaii's constitution. That
groundbreaking decision set off a fury within the national political sys-
tem and led to the federal government's "Defense of Marriage Act"
("DOMA"),7 which effectively rendered the Constitution's full faith and
credit clause moot with reference to same-sex marriages.
3. Rachel Gordon, Bush's Stance Led Newsom to Take Action, SAN FRANCISCO CHRONI-
CLE, Feb. 15, 2004, at A-1.
4. See generally DAVID CARTER, STONEWALL: THE RIOTS THAT SPARKED THE GAY
REVOLUTION (2004).
5. 191 N.W.2d 185 (1971).
6. 852 P.2d 44 (1993).
7. Defense of Marriage Act, 110 Stat. 2419 (1996) (codified at 1 U.S.C. § 7 and 28
U.S.C. § 1738C (2000)).
[Vol. 11: 1
RESTRUCTURING THE MARITAL BEDROOM
Despite such a political backlash, queer rights advocates have
pushed same-sex marriage forward via various lawsuits in different
states, most notably in Vermont and Massachusetts.8 The plaintiffs in
these cases largely based their arguments on the notions of fundamental
liberty and equality under the substantive due process and equal protec-
tion clauses of the Fourteenth Amendment. Explicit notions of privacy,
upon which the Supreme Court supported its previous decisions con-
cerning sexual, individual, and familial autonomy, were noticeably
absent from their briefs. A close examination of those briefs reveals that
same-sex marriage advocates disguised their privacy arguments as liberty
claims. The affirmative decisions delivered by the state supreme courts
in these cases, however, unambiguously incorporated elements of the
privacy doctrine, thereby indicating that privacy does play a useful role
in the pursuit of legalizing same-sex marriage.
9
Feminist criticisms of the privacy doctrine and the holding in Bowers
v. Hardwick0 persuaded queer rights advocates to move away from the
right to privacy as a supportive argument for same-sex marriage and to
dress it as a liberty argument. This note argues that, since Lawrence v.
Texas" has restored that right to queer individuals and their romantic
relationships, the essential elements of the privacy right, specifically
zonal, decisional, and relational rights to privacy," must be inserted into
the proponents' rationale. Doing so will strengthen the advocates' cases
by situating the issue into the historical progression of the courts' prece-
dents, bolstering the claim for legal equality, and increasing public
support by desexualizing same-sex couples.
Part I of this paper examines the reasons underlying queer rights
advocates' reluctance to insert privacy arguments into the case for legal-
izing same-sex marriage. Part II illustrates that, due to such
disinclination, advocates transformed notions of privacy into concepts
of liberty. Part III argues that, after the Lawrence decision, proponents
8. See Goodridge v. Department of Public Health, 798 N.E.2d 941 (Mass. 2003); Baker
v. State of Vermont, 744 A.2d 864 (Vt. 1999).
9. See infa Part 11.
10. 478 U.S. 186 (1986).
11. 539 U.S. 558 (2003).
12. Each of these distinct and separate aspects of the right to privacy arises from the Su-
preme Court's opinions in Griswold v. Connecticut, 381 U.S. 479 (1965), and Roe v.
Wade, 410 U.S. 113 (1973). Specifically, zonal privacy refers to the spatial confines
of privacy, whether within a physical space, such as a home, or within a relationship,
such as a marriage. Decisional privacy encompasses one's right to make fundamental
life decisions, such as if and whom to marry, where to live, and if and when to raise
children. Relational privacy represents the right to choose with whom one associates,
enters into romantic relationships, co-habits, and creates a family.
,,20041
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of same-sex marriage can and should use privacy-based arguments to
fortify their claims.
II. QUEER RIGHTS ADVOCATES' RESISTANCE TO
PRIVAcY-BASED ARGUMENTS
Due to feminist criticisms of the privacy doctrine and the Bowers
decision, queer rights advocates have resisted incorporating explicit pri-
vacy arguments into their claims for legalizing same-sex marriage. This
resistance seems surprising at first because the rights that advocates seek
to gain, including the freedom to choose one's romantic partner, engage
in private, consensual sex, and make fundamental life decisions, are
rights the Supreme Court has already granted in its seminal reproduc-
tive cases. The advocates' decision to minimize privacy-based arguments
and instead emphasize liberty concepts begins to make sense, however,
when regarded against the backdrop of the privacy doctrine's compli-
cated history. That history commenced in the late 1970s, when
Catherine MacKinnon led the feminist criticism against the modern
privacy doctrine. Her work encouraged subsequent scholars to examine
the history of the doctrine and deconstruct its problematic roots. The
Bowers decision came down within this hostile environment and effec-
tively denied privacy rights to queer individuals and their relationships,
thereby severely limiting the judicial tools through which queer rights
advocates could effect social change.
Historically, the queer rights movement has looked to the women's
liberation movement as a model from which to guide its own struggle
for equality. Patricia A. Cain notes this, writing that the "lesbian and
gay civil rights movement has crafted legal arguments based on the suc-
cesses of the arguments made in these earlier civil rights movements [for
race and gender equality], thereby arguing for the extension to gay men
and lesbians of rights that had been earlier won for racial minorities and
women."' 3 The lesbian rights movement in particular stemmed directly
from the women's liberation campaign, as many "women came out [as
lesbians] through feminism, and thought of their sexuality as something
which they could change to line up with their women-centered political
leanings."" As a result, many feminist leaders became staunch queer
rights advocates, perhaps to the point of splintering the struggle for
13. PATRicIAA. CAIN, RAINBOW RIGHTS 14-15 (2000).
14. Emily Griffen, Sex and Sensibility: Stories of a Lesbian Generation by Arlene Stein, 13
BERKELEY WOMEN'S L.J. 315, 315 (1998) (emphasis omitted).
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women's liberation." Indeed, the intersections between queer rights ac-
tivists and feminists trace back even further; many leaders of the first
wave of U.S. feminism were women who shared romantic relationships
with other women.6 This history of overlapping methodologies and
leadership illustrates that queer rights advocates look to the feminist
movement as a potential blueprint for its own efforts. The privacy doc-
trine was no exception to this practice, as queer rights advocates
witnessed feminists' severe dissatisfaction with the doctrine and changed
their strategies accordingly."7
In order to understand the queer rights' movement's reluctance to-
wards privacy-based arguments, one must first understand the doctrine's
historical development. The modern privacy doctrine, which developed
over a series of Supreme Court decisions in the latter half of the twenti-
eth century, established rights of sexual privacy to married and non-
married partners alike. Beginning with Griswold v. Connecticut in 1965
through Planned Parenthood v. Casey" in 1992, the Court identified and
delineated constitutional rights to zonal, decisional, and relational pri-
vacy within the Constitution. Griswold, which protected a married
couple's right to use contraceptives, and Roe v. Wade,2" which defined a
woman's right to abortion as a fundamental right, presented the largest
pillars upon which the Court built its modern privacy doctrine. Conse-
quently, those cases also represented the largest targets for feminist
scholars, who criticized the decisions for enforcing male supremacy.
The Supreme Court protected sexual privacy among married
partners in Griswold by encasing the marital relationship within a zone
of privacy and incorporating relational and decisional privacy rights.
Striking down a Connecticut statute that banned the use of
contraceptives by married couples, the Court held that "specific
guarantees in the Bill of Rights have penumbras" that "create zones of
privacy." 2 Marriage explicitly fell into that zone, as the justices regarded
it as "a relationship lying within the zone of privacy created by several
15. See generally Barbara Epstein, What Happened to the Women " Movemen?., 53 MONTHLY
Rsvipw 1 (May 2001), at http://www.monthlyreview.org/050 lepstein.htm.
16. See generally LILLIAN FADERMAN, To BELIEVE IN WOMEN: WHAT LESBIANS HAVE
DONE FOR AMEicA-A HISTORY (1999) (describing that many feminist leaders in
the nineteenth and twentieth centuries led lives that would be characterized as lesbian
today).
17. See Ruth Harlow's comments infra notes 81-82 and accompanying text.
18. 381 U.S. 479 (1965).
19. 505 U.S. 833 (1992).
20. 410 U.S. 113 (1973).
21. Griswold, 381 U.S. at484.
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fundamental constitutional guarantees."22 The Court characterized the
zone as containing both concrete, spatial confines, namely the "sacred
precincts of marital bedrooms,"2- and intangible elements, as marriage
represented "an association that promotes a way of life. .. .,2 By linking
marriage to the First Amendment's right of association, the Court
defined privacy as a right to associate with a partner of one's choosing.
Soon after delivering its decision, the Court extended these rights to
unmarried partners in Eisenstadt v. Baird,25 thereby providing sexual
privacy to all adults engaged in heterosexual relationships.
In Roe, the Court enlarged the scope of sexual privacy and the right
to make fundamental life decisions without government interference.
Written by Justice Blackmun, the majority pointed to previous cases
that demonstrated that the privacy right "has some extension to activi-
ties relating to marriage, " 16 and that it "is broad enough to encompass a
woman's decision whether or not to terminate her pregnancy. 2 7 Specifi-
cally, that right to privacy included zonal and relational components,
because "zones of privacy ... exist under the Constitution,"'28 and such
zones extend to family relationships 9 Justice Douglas, in his concur-
rence, added the decisional dimension by advocating for privacy "in the
basic decisions of one's life respecting marriage, divorce, procreation,
contraception, and the education and upbringing of children."3 °
By granting married and unmarried heterosexuals the privacy to
conduct their sexual activities and make personal decisions regarding their
romantic relationships without government involvement, Griswold,
Eisenstadt, and Roe present logical platforms upon which to base equality
claims for queers. Same-sex marriage proponents want the exact rights
conferred to different-sex couples so that queer individuals may freely
choose their partners, enjoy sexual privacy, and create a family on their
own terms. Extending the holdings in the reproductive rights cases to
protect same-sex couples does not constitute a radical departure from
the Court's jurisprudence. Rather, granting the existing rights of
heterosexuals to queer persons and unions represents the next step in the
natural progression of the privacy doctrine. Doing so would situate
22. Griswold, 381 U.S. at 485.
23. Griswold, 381 U.S. at 484.
24. Griswold, 381 U.S. at 484.
25. 405 U.S. 438 (1972).
26. Roe, 410 U.S. at 152.
27. Roe, 410 U.S. at 153.
28. Roe, 410 U.S. at 152.
29. Roe, 410 U.S. at 153.
30. Doe v. Bolton, 410 U.S. 179, 211 (1973) (Douglas, J., concurring in Roe v. Wade,
410 U.S. 113 (1973)) (emphasis omitted).
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queer rights within the Court's doctrinal history and provide advocates
with the tremendous strength of judicial precedent. Queer rights
activists, however, have not advocated this progression, choosing instead
to dress the privacy doctrine as a liberty argument.3 Their reasons for
this decision include the scathing criticisms of privacy-based arguments
by the feminist movement and the Supreme Court's damaging decision
in Bowers.
Catherine MacKinnon led the feminist movement's criticism of the
modern privacy doctrine by deconstructing its principles as those that
enforce men's domination and women's oppression. In her examination
of abortion rights, she notes that, instead of guaranteeing bodily integ-
rity and freedom of choice, the "law of privacy instead translates
traditional liberal values into [the rhetoric of] individual rights as a
means of subordinating those rights to specific social imperatives. "0 2 She
believes that a woman's legal right to privacy translates into "a means of
subordinating women's collective needs to the imperatives of male su-
premacy. , She also regards the privacy doctrine as a vehicle for freeing
male sexual aggression and reinforcing the gender inequality that exists
between heterosexual partners. Understanding privacy as "the ultimate
value of the negative state,"34 she contends that the doctrine purports
that "no act of the state contributes to shaping its internal alignments or
distributing its internal forces, so no act of the state should participate in
changing it. Such a perception by defenders of the doctrine "presup-
poses that the private is not already an arm of the state,"" that "intimacy
is implicitly thought to guarantee symmetry of power."3 7
Due to these defenders' misperceptions of privacy, MacKinnon as-
serts that the doctrine only serves to reinforce the status quo. She states
that the "existing distribution of power and resources within the private
sphere are precisely what the law of privacy exists to protect; 8 thus,
"the measure of the intimacy has been the measure of the oppression"3 9
for women. As a result, MacKinnon contends that "getting anything
31. See infra Part I.
32. CATHERINE A. MACKINNON, TOWARD A FEMINIST THEORY OF THE STATE 187
(1989).
33. Id. at 187 88.




38. Id. at 193.
39. Id. at 191.
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private to be perceived as coercive"4" is nearly impossible because "[t]o
complain in public of inequality within the private contradicts the lib-
eral definition of the private."41 She emphasizes that social change
necessitates state involvement because "if inequality is socially pervasive
and enforced, equality will require intervention, not abdication, to be
meaningful; 42 with this argument, she thereby calls upon feminists "to
explode the private."43
MacKinnon's critique of the modern privacy doctrine encouraged
other feminist scholars to examine and criticize its early roots; under-
standing this history is necessary to illustrate the queer rights' advocates'
distrust of the doctrine. The American legal system developed the no-
tion of privacy through family law, as privacy was employed as a means
of protecting individuals from government interference by way of the
family unit. The doctrine did not solidify until the latter half of the
eighteenth-century because privacy, as we understand the concept today,
did not exist at that time. Rather, as historian Nancy Cott describes, the
"very circumstances of household life facilitated the intervention of
neighbors, and even more readily, of lodgers, into a couple's affairs."
41
Everything from the spatial configurations of the home, where married
persons shared their bed with boarders,45 to religious and social values,
which encouraged the "predisposition to be one's brother's and sister's
keeper, ' comprised such circumstances. As a result, the community as
a whole exercised guardianship over family affairs,47 so the notions of
decisional, relational, and zonal privacy did not exist.
By the latter half of the eighteenth-century, courts began to build
the groundwork for a privacy doctrine based upon marital privilege, and
modern feminists criticize that development for (in)advertently
condoning violence against women. Scholar Elizabeth M. Schneider
asserts that "[w]oman-abuse is an aspect of the basic gender inequality
built into the very fabric of American family law,"A8 because "battering is
perceived as a 'private' problem, neither serious nor criminal."49
Historian Reva B. Siegel credits the emergence of privacy as a
40. Id. at 190.
41. Id.
42. Id. at 191-92.
43. Id. at 191.
44. Nancy F. Cott, Eighteenth-Century Family and Social Lifi Revealed in Massachusetts
Divorce Records, 10 J. Soc. HIST. 20, 23 (1976).
45. Id.
46. Id.
47. Id. at 22.
48. Elizabeth M. Schneider, The Violence ofPrivaty, 23 CONN. L. Rav. 973, 981 (1991).
49. Id. at 982.
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supplementary rationale for justifying wife-beating "when rationales
rooted in authority-based discourses of marriage had begun to lose their
persuasive power."50 She points towards such cases as State v. Rhodes," in
which the North Carolina Supreme Court held that, although a
husband does not have the right to chastise his wife, the state will not
interfere with the "family government.' 2 By observing that the
"violence complained of would without question have constituted a
battery if the subject of it had not been the defendant's wife," the court
defended its holding by declaring that "the evil of publicity would be
greater than the evil involved in the trifles complained of ... [which]
ought to be left to family government.""
The use of privacy to perpetuate patriarchal structures by
condoning violence against women also emerges in the history of
marital rape, further alienating queer rights activists from the doctrine.
Legal historians frequently cite Sir Matthew Hale, the Chief Justice of
the Court of King's Bench in the seventeenth century, as the
authoritative voice behind the marital rape exemption. He argued that a
"husband cannot be guilty of a rape committed by himself upon his
lawful wife"'4 because, by contracting and consenting to marriage, "the
wife hath given up herself in this kind unto her husband, which she
cannot retract."" Professor Jill Hasday notes that Hale's supposition
characterizes the "mutual decision to marry as grounds for subjecting
wives and husbands to very different obligations and rights." 6
Specifically, a woman's agreement to marriage "gave the husband a right
of sexual access to his wife" and "bestowed an obligation on the wife to
submit."17 Common law adopted Hale's assertion that a man cannot be
guilty of raping his wife, and the Model Penal Code codified it, reasoning
that "[r]etaining the spousal exclusion avoids this unwarranted intrusion
of the penal law into the life of the family."'8 Modern feminists attack the
privacy doctrine for such a justification, as Hasday believes that "the use
50. Reva B. Siegel, "The Rule of Love" Wife Beating as Prerogative and Privacy, 105 YALE
L.J. 2117, 2151 (1996).
51. 61 N.C. (Phil. Law) 453 (1868).
52. Id.
53. Rhodes, 61 N.C. at 454.
54. MATTHEW HALE, 1 THE HISTORY OF THE PLEAss OF THE CRoWN 628 (Robert H.
Small ed., 1st Am. Ed. 1847) (1736).
55. Id
56. Jill Elaine Hasday, Contest and Consent: A Legal History of Marital Rape, 88 CAL. L
REv. 1373, 1400 (2000).
57. Id.
58. MODEL PENAL CODE § 213.1 cmt. 8(c) (1980).
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of the privacy rationales to justify nonintervention in cases of marital
rape protects and exacerbates the current distribution of power within a
marriage."5 The privacy doctrine presents a double-edged sword, giving
"husbands safety in committing highly injurious conduct that the law
would otherwise consider felonious, while simultaneously disabling
,,61
wives from summoning state resources for their own protection.
Due to these feminist criticisms of the privacy doctrine as a means
by which to effect and maintain patriarchy within the family unit and
society at large, queer rights advocates minimized privacy-based argu-
ments in favor of feminists' advice to rely upon concepts of liberty.
Schneider represents one such feminist by interpreting the right to pri-
vacy as a passive right that obstructs state intervention, whereas a liberty
interest would "imply that the state had an affirmative obligation to en-
sure that women can exercise their freedom.",6 1 She underscores this view
by declaring that the "notion of women as agents of their own lives is an
important and powerful concept that transcends the common experi-
ence of the concept of privacy."62 Siegel advocates for a similar change
because reproductive rights are "generally discussed as a negative liberty,
a right of privacy, a right to be let alone,"63 a perception that she finds
"at odds with other important aspects of feminist thought."64
The queer rights advocates' reluctance to use privacy-based
arguments was reinforced by the Supreme Court's divisive decision in
Bowers v. Hardwick, which denied zonal, relational, and decisional privacy
rights to queer individuals and relationships.65 In a five to four vote led by
Justice White, the Court upheld a Georgia statute that criminalized
sodomy, defined as oral or anal sex, among consenting adults. The case
arose when an Atlanta police officer, following up a citation for drinking
an alcoholic beverage in public, entered Michael Hardwick's bedroom
and witnessed Hardwick engaging in consensual sexual activity with
another man." Hardwick challenged the constitutionality of the statute,
claiming that it violated his right to privacy. 7 The Eleventh Circuit
agreed with Hardwick, holding that, under the privacy doctrine as
59. Hasday, supra note 56, at 1491.
60. Id.
61. Schneider, supra note 48, at 998.
62. Id.
63. Reva B. Siegel, Abortion as a Sex Equality Right: Its Basis in Feminist Theory, in
MOTHERS IN LAW: FMINIsT THEORY AND THE LEGAL REGULATION OF MOTHER-
HOOD 43 (Martha Albertson Fineman & Isabel Karpin eds., 1995).
64. Id.
65. 478 U.S. 186 (1986).
66. LEE WALZER, GAY RIGHTS ON TRIAL 68 (2002).
67. See Bowers, 478 U.S. at 188; WALZER, supra note 66, at 69.
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established by Griswold and Roe, "the Georgia Statute violated
respondent's fundamental rights because his homosexual activity is a
private and intimate association that is beyond the reach of state
regulation... .,,68 The Supreme Court, however, overturned this ruling
by restructuring the issue at stake: rather than understanding the case as
a right to privacy, the majority regarded it as "whether the Federal
Constitution confers a fundamental right upon homosexuals to engage
in sodomy.
6 9
By framing the case's central inquiry in such a limited manner, the
Court separated this decision from its previous privacy cases, thereby
avoiding a proper application of the modern privacy doctrine. The opin-
ion purported that "none of the rights announced in those cases
[Griswold, Roe, et. al.] bears any resemblance to the claimed constitu-
tional right of homosexuals to engage in acts of sodomy"70 because its
authors failed to recognize a "connection between family, marriage, or
procreation on one hand and homosexual activity on the other."7 In
other words, the majority held that queer people do not deserve rela-
tional or decisional privacy rights because such persons do not have the
capability to choose a partner, raise children, or create a family. The
Court also removed zonal privacy rights from queer people by refusing
to respect the spatial confine of that right, the "sacred precinct"" of the
bedroom. Instead, the majority believed that sodomy represented a
criminal act and that "otherwise illegal conduct is not always immu-
nized whenever it occurs in the home."
73
The Bowers majority's veering away from the Court's privacy
doctrine prompted severe criticism from queer rights advocates and the
Court's own dissenting justices. Critics faulted the majority for
improperly framing the issue at stake, declaring that "what animated the
Supreme Court in this case was the issue of homosexuality rather than
the right of privacy."74 Activist Lee Walzer argues that the Court had not
conditioned the right to privacy "explicitly on the nexus with
(heterosexual) family relationships"75 in Griswold and Roe, but that
decisions pertaining to intimate matters fell "into the sphere of personal
68. Bowers v. Hardwick, 478 U.S. 186, 189 (1986) (relating holding of lower court in
Bowers v. Hardwick, 760 F.2d 1202 (1985)).
69. Bowers, 478 U.S. at 190.
70. Bowers, 478 U.S. at 190-91.
71. Bowers, 478 U.S. at 191.
72. Griswold v. Connecticut, 381 U.S. 479, 485 (1965).
73. Bowers, 478 U.S. at 195.
74. WALZER, supra note 66, at 70.
75. Id. at 75.
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autonomy that cannot be touched by the heavy hand of the state or its
agents. 76 Justice Blackmun expressed similar sentiments in his
dissenting opinion, indicating that the majority betrayed the Court's
privacy doctrine by denying queers the "ability to make constitutionally
protected 'decisions concerning sexual relations.' ,7 He stressed that "in
a Nation as diverse as ours ... there may be many 'right' ways of
conducting"" intimate relationships, and he berated his colleagues for
failing "to recognize ... the fundamental interest all individuals have in
controlling the nature of their intimate associations with others.",
7
1
The devastating decision in Bowers, coupled with the feminists' se-
vere critiques of the modern and early privacy doctrines, persuaded
queer rights advocates to move away from explicit privacy-based argu-
ments. As scholar Martin Dupuis writes, after Bowers, "it seem[ed] that
a claim for gay and lesbian rights based on a substantive due process ar-
gument, such as privacy, [would] not succeed in the United States."80
Indeed, queer rights advocates turned away from such arguments be-
cause Bowers prevented them from referring to the federal Constitution
and the privacy rights guaranteed under that document.81 Following the
feminists' advice, they turned towards liberty-based arguments instead,
but such a decision came at a cost to the queer rights movement.
1II. SAME-SEX MARRIAGE PROPONENTS TANSFORM
PRIVACY INTO LIBERTY ARGUMENTS
Due to the simultaneous attack on the privacy doctrine by feminist
critics and the Bowers decision, same-sex marriage advocates minimized
explicit notions of privacy in their arguments and presented them as
concepts of liberty. Ruth Harlow, former legal director of Lambda Legal
Education and Defense Fund, expresses the advocates' intent, stating
that "privacy has been criticized so much as coming from thin air and
[being] associated with Roe v. Wade that we [advocates] emphasized lib-
erty."82 Dupuis underscores this assertion, writing that the "legal
76. Id.
77. Bowers, 478 U.S. at 203 n.2 (Blackmun, J., dissenting) (quoting Carey v. Population
Services International, 431 U.S. 678, 711 (1977) (Powel, J., concurring in part and
concurring in judgment).
78. Bowers, 478 U.S. at 205.
79. Bowers, 478 U.S. at 206.
80. MARTIN Dupuis, SAME-SEX MARRIAGE, LEGAL MOBILIZATION, & THE POLITICS OF
RIGHTS 26 (2002).
81. Ruth Harlow, Address at the University of Michigan Law School (March 25, 2004).
82. Id.
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framework for discussing the rights of gays and lesbians was redefined"83
in the years following Bowers. Such a shift in the queer rights movement
is best illustrated in the plaintiffs' briefs filed in the major same-sex rela-
tionship cases, namely Baker v. State of Vermont and Goodridge v.
Department ofPublic Health. The judges who delivered decisions favor-
able to same-sex marriages, however, partially relied upon the privacy
doctrine in order to do so. An examination of the courts' decisions in
comparison to the plaintiffs' briefs reveals that the privacy doctrine does
indeed play a positive role in the debate, despite the obstacles presented
by feminist critics and the majority in Bowers.
Before delving into Baker and Goodridge, both of which ordered le-
gal recognition of same-sex relationships, one must first examine Baehr
v. Lewin, a Hawaiian State Supreme Court case that fell short of such a
mandate.8 4 The majority held that the denial of marriage licenses to
same-sex couples establishes a sex-based classification, which is pre-
sumed to violate the equal protection clause of the state constitution.85
Decided in 1993, the court remanded the case to the lower court for
retrial, instructing that the state must prove that issuing such licenses
jeopardized compelling state interests.86 In 1996, the trial court re-heard
Baehr and declared that Hawaii's refusal to grant marriage licenses to
same-sex couples violated that state's constitution. 7 The Hawaiian legis-
lature and voters responded by amending the state's constitution to
define marriage as a legally recognized relationship between one man
81
and one woman, thereby rendering the judicial process on this case
moot. At the same time, the federal government enacted the so-called
"Defense of Marriage Act," which denied federal benefits to married
people of the same sex and authorized states to ignore such marriages if
other states legally permitted them."
The Hawaiian Supreme Court's failure to mandate legal recogni-
tion to same-sex couples stemmed from its failure to address the relevant
issue. The plaintiffs in the case, three same-sex couples, claimed that the
state's refusal to grant them marriage licenses violated their rights to pri-
vacy under the Hawaiian constitution. The court reviewed the Supreme
83. Dupuis, supra note 80, at 26.
84. 852 P.2d 44 (Haw. 1993).
85. Id. at 59-68.
86. Baehr, 852 P.2d at 68.
87. WALZER, supra note 66, at 136.
88. Id.
89. 1 U.S.C. 5 7 (2000); 28 U.S.C. § 1738C (2000); see also Introduction, SAME-SEX
MARRIAGE: THE MORAL AND LEGAL DEBATE 9-10 (Robert M. Baird & Stuart E.
Rosenbaum eds., 1997).
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Court's privacy doctrine and determined that it protected decisions re-
lating to marriage and family relationships. ° The privacy provision in
Article 1, Section 5 of the Hawaiian constitution directly reflected those
holdings because it was purposefully added to the document after Gris-
wold and Roe.9" Nevertheless, instead of applying these principles to the
case at hand, the Hawaiian court narrowly defined the issue, much like
the U.S. Supreme Court did in Bowers. The majority phrased the ques-
tion as whether the right of privacy extends to same-sex marriage,
neglecting the larger issues at stake, namely an individual's rights to
zonal, decisional, and relational privacy.
The plaintiffs' original complaint in Baker v. State of Vermont took
a different approach by transforming the privacy doctrine into an argu-
ment based upon the concept of liberty. The suit, also filed by three
same-sex couples, stated that Vermont's refusal to issue marriage licenses
to them violated the state constitution's Common Benefits Clause. De-
claring that the state "government is, or ought to be, instituted for the
common benefit, protection, and security of the people... and not for
the particular emolument or advantage of any single person, family or
set of persons, who are a part only of that community,"92 the clause sup-
ported plaintiffs' claim that restricting marriage licenses to heterosexual
couples denied same-sex couples the "common benefits" that marriage
provided. They underscored this principle by referring to Supreme
Court and Vermont state cases that held marriage as "one of the most
fundamental of all our human and civil rights .... 93
The plaintiffs built their case upon the concept of liberty as pro-
tected under the Common Benefits clause, but notions of privacy
permeated the brief. By opening with a statement of facts that carried
the reader into the private homes and lives of the plaintiffs, the brief
invited the court to infiltrate their zonal privacy. Doing so was meant to
lead to the conclusion that such privacy was only possible via marriage.
The plaintiffs revealed their names, their children's names, their places
of residency, and their occupations.94 They even divulged the number of
years that each couple had spent together, as well as such personal de-
tails as the tragic loss of one couple's child due to heart failure.9"
90. Baehr, 852 P.2d at 56.
91. Baehr, 852 P.2d at 55.
92. VT. CONST. ch. I, art. 7.
93. Mary Bonauto et al., The Freedom to Marry for Same-Sex Couples: The Opening Appel-
late Brief of Plaintiff Stan Baker et al. in Baker et al. v. State of Vermont, 5 MICH. J.
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The plaintiffs continued to address ideas of privacy under the ru-
bric of liberty within the body of the brief. The fundamental right to
marriage that the plaintiffs desired actually represented a right to deci-
sional and relational privacy. They asked for the "the right to marry the
person we love, the person with whom we want to share our lives."96 In
other words, the plaintiffs requested the right to make their own deci-
sions concerning their intimate relationships without state interference.
Such a right represented the decisional and relational privacy rights that
the U.S. Supreme Court established via its development of the modern
privacy doctrine. The plaintiffs highlighted decisional privacy rights in
their brief by citing Perez v. Lippold97 (holding unconstitutional a state
anti-miscegenation law) in order to express that the "'essence of the
right to marry is freedom to join in marriage with the person of one's
choice."' 98 The plaintiffs again emphasized decisional and relational pri-
vacy rights in their conclusion by asserting that "[w]hen two adults
make the very intimate and personal decision to commit themselves to
one another by marrying, that decision should not be subject to 'legisla-
tive hearings and debate.' ,
Queer rights advocates further dressed the privacy doctrine as a
liberty concept in the plaintiffs' reply brief, filed in response to the
state's answer to their original complaint. The plaintiffs opened their
reply with an appeal to relational privacy rights, quoting the U.S.
Supreme Court's assertion that "'certain kinds of personal bonds have
played a critical role in the culture and traditions of the Nation . 1.."'100
By giving individuals the privacy to choose how and with whom to live
their lives, the court could protect such relationships from unwarranted
state interference, which "safeguards the ability independently to define
one's identity that is central to any concept of liberty."'"1 Thus, the
plaintiffs directly connected the notions of relational and decisional
privacy to the concept of liberty. They expanded this link by citing the
Supreme Court's observation that family relationships involve
"'distinctively personal aspects of one's life,' ,102 which highlighted
relational privacy, and that the government could not force "'all to live
96. Id. at415.
97. 198 P.2d 17 (1948).
98. Bonauto, supra note 93, at 471 (citingPerez, 198 P.2d at 21) (emphasis omitted).
99. Id. at 474 (quoting State of Vermont's Motion to Dismiss in Baker et al. at 3).
100. Mary Bonauto et al., The Freedom to Mary for Same-Sex Couples: The Reply Brief of
Plaintiffl Stan Baker et al. in Baker et al. v. State of Vermont, 6 MIcH. J. GENDER &
L. 1, 5 (1999) (quoting Roberts v. United States Jaycees, 468 U.S. 609, 618 (1984)).
101. Id. at 6 (quoting Roberts, 468 U.S. at 619).
102. Id. (quoting Roberts, 468 U.S. at 620).
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in certain narrowly defined family patterns,' ',03 which illustrated
decisional privacy. The plaintiffs again transformed their privacy claims
into liberty arguments by invoking the Supreme Court's privacy
doctrine, which also implicitly criticized the Baehr court: "If courts
defined historical 'fundamental rights' at the level of specificity urged by
the State, privacy would not include rights to contraception, abortion,
or interracial marriage. ' '
Despite the plaintiffs' explicit emphasis on liberty and the notice-
able dearth of privacy-based arguments, the majority in Baker relied
upon relational and decisional privacy rights to hold that the state was
constitutionally required to extend the benefits and protections of mar-
riage to same-sex couples. Citing recent studies and statistics regarding
lesbian and gay parenting, the court determined that the legal protec-
tions that stemmed from marriage protect children by way of shielding
the family unit."5 It noted the state's suggestion that the government
carried an interest in "promoting a permanent commitment between
couples who have children [in order] to ensure that their children are
considered legitimate and receive ongoing parental support."" 6 The
court also held that the state's argument that "Vermont public policy
favors opposite-sex over same-sex parents' ' 107 was without merit because
of a recent law that removed all prior legal barriers to the adoption of
children by same-sex couples. Depriving same-sex couples of this rela-
tional privacy, the court reasoned, "exposes their children to the precise
risks that the State argues the marriage laws are designed to secure
against."0 8
Although the court held that same-sex couples deserved to receive
the same privileges as those in heterosexual relationships, it fell short of
ordering the issuance of marriage licenses to such couples. Its reasoning
for doing so was purely etymological, as the court merely pointed to the
definition in Webster's dictionary and the historical meaning of the
term under Vermont statutes and common law'0 9 to support its stance.
Nevertheless, at the time that it delivered its opinion, the Vermont
Supreme Court granted the broadest range of legal rights and
protections, including the various rights to privacy, that had ever been
made available to same-sex couples in the United States.
103. Id. (quoting Moore v. East Cleveland, 431 U.S. 494, 506 (1977)).
104. Id. at4.
105. Baker v. Vermont, 744 A.2d 864, 881 (1999).
106. Baker, 744 A.2d at 881.
107. Baker, 744 A.2d at 885.
108. Baker, 744 A.2d at 882 (emphasis omitted).
109. Baker, 744 A.2d at 868-69.
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Four years after the Baker decision, the Massachusetts Supreme
Court became the first American court to order the issuance of marriage
licenses to same-sex couples. The court, which heard the case on March
4, 2003, was expected to announce its decision in July. It postponed
doing so because of the Supreme Court's decision in Lawrence, which
was issued at the end of June 2003."0 Finally delivered in November,
Goodridge v. Department of Public Health.1 held that denials of plain-
tiffs' attempts to marry violated the individual liberty and equality
provisions of the Massachusetts Constitution, and it remanded the case
for entry of judgment. The court granted 180 days stay for such entry in
order to permit the state legislature to take appropriate action. The state
senate responded one month later, asking the court if the creation of
domestic partnerships, like those in Vermont, would satisfy the court's
ruling. The court responded with a strong affirmation of its holding in
Goodridge:
[blecause the proposed law by its express terms forbids same-
sex couples entry into civil marriage, it continues to relegate
same-sex couples to a different status. The holding in Good-
ridge, by which we are bound, is that group classifications
based on unsupportable distinctions, such as that embodied in
the proposed bill, are invalid under the Massachusetts Consti-
tution. The history of our nation has demonstrated that
separate is seldom, if ever, equal.1 2
The plaintiffs' brief in Goodridge followed the example set in Baker,
incorporating the notions of zonal, decisional, and relational privacy
rights but presenting such ideas as liberty concepts. Just as in Baker, the
brief opened with an appeal to zonal privacy by exposing the private
lives of the plaintiffs, who comprised seven same-sex couples. The au-
thors of this brief gave even more details than those who wrote Baker by
revealing not only the individuals' names, professions, locations, and
children's names, but also their particular harms from the inaccessibility
of marriage. Hillary Goodridge, for instance, had difficulty gaining ac-
cess to her partner after "Julie had a difficult caesarian and was in
recovery for several hours."1 3 She could not even visit her newborn
daughter, who had "breathed in fluid [during birth] and was sent to
110. Lawrence v. Texas, 539 U.S. 558 (2003).
111. 798 N.E.2d 941 (Mass. 2003).
112. Opinions of theJustices to the Senate, 802 N.E.2d 565, 569 (Mass. 2004).
113. Brief for Appellants at 3, Goodridge, 798 N.E.2d 941.
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neonatal intensive care."' 4 David Wilson and Robert Compton, who
together took care of David's ill parents until their deaths, also con-
fronted problems of accessibility within the medical care community."'
Edward Balmelli, on the other hand, faced no pressing medical issues
but wanted to provide financially for his partner, Michael Horgan, by
naming "Mike as the beneficiary of his pension plan,"' an option made
available to married couples only.
Plaintiffs transformed privacy rights into liberty concepts by consis-
tently connecting the two throughout their brief. They opened their
argument with a statement that liberty incorporated the rights to deci-
sional and relational privacy: "the right to marry the person of one's
choice is protected under the liberty and due process protections of the
Massachusetts Constitution."" 7 They pointed towards "this Court's
precedents of respect for private personal decisions and expressive and
intimate associations 'is as further support for that liberty claim. Plain-
tiffs then delved into their full argument with a statement equating
privacy rights to liberty concepts: "The right to marry the person you
love and with whom you wish to share your life is one of the most fun-
damental of all our human and civil rights.""' Citing certain provisions
of the Massachusetts Constitution and previous case law, the plaintiffs
also asserted a right to zonal privacy, as the government may not exer-
cise control over "spheres of individual choice and behavior."' 20 They
underscored this particular privacy right by averring that marriage "is
embraced within the sphere of privacy and self-determination protected
by the liberty and due process clauses of the Massachusetts Constitu-
tio n .
,,121
The plaintiffs further developed their liberty-based arguments by
examining the privacy-based precedents set by other courts. They
referred to Planned Parenthood v. Casey22 (affirming the core of Roe but
permitting certain restrictions to the abortion right) to illustrate that the
United States Constitution protects against unwarranted state
interference with personal decisions relating to marriage and family.
Quoting that case directly, the brief explained that state intrusion into
these core decisions imposed an intolerable burden on an individual, as
114. Id.




119. Id. at 10-11.
120. Id. at 19.
121. Id. at 21-22.
122. 505 U.S. 833 (1992).
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such matters "involve the most intimate choices a person may make in a
lifetime.' 2 They connected this notion to liberty by asserting that
decisional privacy is "central to the liberty protected by the Fourteenth
Amendment., 2 4 Plaintiffs again linked decisional privacy to liberty by
citing the California Supreme Court's decision in Perez, which held that
the "right to marry without the freedom to marry the person of one's
choice is no right at all."' 25 Lastly, the plaintiffs pointed to several child
welfare cases and debunked the state's argument that heterosexual-led
households provided better environments for childrearing. Delineating
those cases' overall theme, that a "parent can raise his or her child as the
parent wishes, absent some strong concern about the child's welfare, ' 6
the plaintiffs asserted that "the state cannot demonstrate an interest in
any particular type of parental role modeling in any family."'27
Despite the plaintiffs' diminishing of privacy-based arguments, pri-
vacy rights played a substantial role in the Goodridge decision, the only
American case thus far to grant full marriage rights to same-sex couples.
Recognizing that marriage "bestows enormous private and social advan-
tages on those who choose to marry," the court looked towards
Griswold for its demarcation of zonal, decisional, and relational privacy.
Doing so led the court to characterize the institution of marriage as one
that celebrated "the ideals of mutuality, companionship, intimacy, fidel-
ity, and family.' 2 9 Relying upon the precedent set by Griswold, the
court placed its decision within the natural progression of the modern
privacy doctrine. This enabled the court to portray its application of the
doctrine's principles as a logical extension of those rights. Whereas the
Baehr court refused to apply the doctrine, the Massachusetts Supreme
Court rightly recognized that the "rights implicated in this case are at
the core of individual privacy."' 3 ° Stated more explicitly, the judges held
that "the decision whether and whom to marry is among life's momen-
tous acts of self-definition"'3 and that "[without the right to marry--or
more properly, the right to choose to marry-one is excluded from the
123. Brief for Appellants at 25, Goodridge, 798 N.E.2d 941, citing Casey, 505 U.S. at 851.
124. Id.
125. Id.
126. Id. at 44.
127. Id. at 43.
128. Goodridge, 798 N.E.2d at 954.
129. Goodridge, 798 N.E.2d at 954.
130. Goodridge, 798 N.E.2d at 957 n.15.
131. Goodridge, 798 N.E.2d at 955.
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full range of human experience and denied full protection of the
laws .... ,,132
The Goodridge majority bolstered privacy as a basis for its holding
by invoking the significance of the Lawrence decision. Citing the re-
cently delivered case in its introductory paragraphs, the opinion stated
that Lawrence restored decisional and relational privacy rights to queer
individuals and their relationships:
There, the Court affirmed that the core concept of common
human dignity protected by the Fourteenth Amendment to
the United State Constitution precludes government intrusion
into the deeply personal realms of consensual adult expressions
of intimacy and one's choice of an intimate partner. The Court
also reaffirmed the central role that decisions whether to marry
or have children bear in shaping one's identity.'
Thus, by relying upon both the privacy doctrine and the Lawrence
decision, in spite of the plaintiffs' efforts to minimize those arguments,
the Massachusetts Supreme Court illustrated that privacy does play a
vital role in extending civil marriage to same-sex couples.
The queer rights movement's shift from privacy-based arguments
to notions of liberty came at a cost to the movement's broader goals. By
turning away from the privacy doctrine, advocates removed the power
of precedent from the struggle for equality. The movement lost the op-
portunity to situate itself within the natural progression of the doctrine,
a position that would have elevated the legitimacy of the activists' claims
in the public eye. Instead, without such a substantial force to fortify its
arguments, advocates worked outside the established doctrines and pur-
sued their actions on the basis of liberty. Although the movement did
achieve some victories this way, the power of stare decisis and the courts'
desire to rely upon such precedents remained, as evidenced by the Baker
and Goodridge decisions.
Another cost incurred by the queer rights movement for abandoning
the privacy doctrine is the perception of accepted inferiority. By choosing
not to attack the view that certain rights applied to heterosexual
individuals and couples only, and that queer people did not enjoy such
rights, advocates appeared implicitly to accept the legal inferiority of
queers to their heterosexual counterparts. Such a perception damaged the
movement's fight for civil rights because legal and social equality will not
be granted to queers until they achieve the same respect as heterosexuals.
132. Goodridge, 798 N.E.2d at 957.
133. Goodridge, 798 N.E.2d at 948.
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Avoiding this issue altogether and relying upon liberty arguments only,
advocates did little to raise the perceived legal status of queer individuals
to the broader society. In order to achieve full equality, including
marriage rights that are recognized in every state, advocates must place
the movement within legal doctrinal history and outwardly demonstrate
its refusal of legal inferiority to heterosexuals.
IV. INSERTING THE PRIVACY DOCTRINE INTO THE
CASE FOR SAME-SEX MARRIAGE
Lawrence v. Texas,' which overruled Bowers and restored zonal, re-
lational, and decisional privacy rights to queer individuals and their
relationships, enables queer rights advocates to make privacy-based ar-
guments and compensate for its losses incurred since abandoning the
doctrine. The case arose in Harris County, Texas when the sheriffs offi-
cers, responding to a false report of a weapons disturbance, entered John
Lawrence's home and discovered Lawrence and Tyron Garner having
sex.'35 The officers charged the men with violating the Homosexual
Conduct Law, 3 6 which criminalized consensual, adult sexual relations
between same-sex partners. Although the charges were later dropped,
Lawrence and Garner chose to challenge the statute's constitutionality,
and their case reached the Supreme Court in March 2003.
A five-justice majority, led by Justice Kennedy, held the Texas law
unconstitutional because it violated the due process clause of the Four-
teenth Amendment by depriving same-sex couples the right to
privacy.17 In its opening sentence, the majority underscored the right to
zonal privacy by writing that "[1] iberty protects the person from unwar-
ranted government intrusions into a dwelling or other private places.""' 8
The opinion quickly revealed, however, that such privacy rights ex-
tended beyond merely zonal rights, as "there are other spheres of our
lives and existence, outside the home, where the State should not be a
dominant presence. " "'
The Court relied upon and expanded the modern privacy doctrine
in order to determine its holding. The opinion first conjured Griswold
to illustrate that the right to privacy guarded sexual choices and that the
134. 539 U.S. 558 (2003).
135. Brief for Appellants at 2, Lawrence, 539 U.S. 558 (2003) (No. 02-102).
136. Tnx. PENAL CODE ANN. § 21.06 (2004).
137. Lawrence, 539 U.S. 558.
138. Lawrence, 539 U.S. at 562.
139. Lawrence, 539 U.S. at 562.
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marital bedroom was a protected space. 140 The Court then turned to
Eisenstadt to indicate that an individual harbors the right "'to be free
from unwarranted governmental intrusion into matters so fundamen-
tally affecting a person.' ..... Finally, Roe, which recognized a woman's
right "to make certain fundamental decisions affecting her destiny,
1 42
confirmed once again that "the protection of liberty under the Due
Process Clause has a substantive dimension of fundamental significance
in defining the rights of the person."'43 Thus, with its reliance upon the
Court's established modern privacy doctrine, the majority situated Law-
rence within that doctrine and guaranteed rights to zonal, decisional,
and relational privacy to queer individuals and their relationships.
By asserting that Lawrence belonged within the modern privacy
doctrine, the Court simultaneously recognized Bowers as an aberration
of that doctrine. The Court rebuked that case's majority for failing "to
appreciate the extent of the liberty at stake,' '4 4 which was not a funda-
mental right to homosexual sodomy, but a right to the protection of
"the most private human conduct, sexual behavior, and in the most pri-
vate of places, the home."'' 45 Overruling Bowers enabled the Court to
restore the various elements of privacy to queer individuals, noting that
such a "personal relationship ... is within the liberty of persons to
choose without being punished as criminals.""' Stated more explicitly,
"[t]he liberty protected by the Constitution allows homosexual persons
the right to make this choice." 47 By focusing on the greater rights at
stake, instead of a sexual act, the Supreme Court restored queer indi-
viduals' claims to the zonal, decisional, and relational privacy rights that
Bowers had stripped away.
In the post-Lawrence era, which protects and provides privacy
rights to queer individuals and their romantic relationships, the tradi-
tional, historical privacy doctrine should play an important role in
advocating the legalization of same-sex marriage. As previously dis-
cussed, marriage rights advocates have incorporated the essential
elements of the privacy doctrine within their arguments, but they have
done so under the rubric of liberty. By being open and honest about its
modes of argumentation, queer rights advocates would advance their
goals for an accepting world in which individuals can freely come "out"
140. Lawrence, 539 U.S. at 565.
141. Lawrence at 565 (citing Eisenstadt v. Bard, 405 U.S. 438, 453 (1972)).
142. Lawrence, 539 U.S. at 565.
143. Lawrence, 539 U.S. at 565.
144. Lawrence, 539 U.S. at 567.
145. Lawrence, 539 U.S. at 567.
146. Lawrence, 539 U.S. at 567.
147. Lawrence, 539 U.S. at 567.
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about their true identities and be treated as equally as their heterosexual
counterparts. Just as many queer persons have found that their "coming
out" has increased their privacy,' same-sex marriage advocates will real-
ize that an open dialogue with explicit privacy arguments will grant the
very privacy and equality rights that they aim to achieve via marriage.
Specifically, arguments relating to the zonal, decisional, and relational
rights to privacy promote equality for same-sex and opposite-sex couples
alike by transforming the marital zone into a more egalitarian space,
applying the power of stare decisis to all citizens, and respecting the ro-
mantic relationships between two individuals, regardless of their sex.
Marriage provides a zone of privacy to the coupling of two indi-
viduals into which the government may not intrude; depriving this right
from same-sex partners relegates such persons to a lower status than
their heterosexual counterparts. This right to zonal privacy is, in the
words of Justice Douglas, "older than the Bill of Rights--older than our
political parties, older than our school system."'49 The American judicial
system codifies this zone in its civil and criminal courts, from protecting
confidences between married couples to freeing a person from testifying
against her spouse. The state's exclusion of queer individuals from this
zone and its privileges imposes a inferior status upon such persons.
Of course, as demonstrated by feminist critics, the zone of privacy
surrounding marriage can be problematic, but extending that space to
include same-sex couples would transform the zone itself. Feminists
criticize zonal privacy for reflecting and perpetuating the sex hierarchy
that persists in society, but no such hierarchy exists within same-sex
partnerships. This is not to say that same-sex partnerships always
function with complete equality, as power struggles may occur within
any relationship, but that "queering" the zone will promote equality
between heterosexual couples by transforming it into a sex-equal space.
By not following the patriarchal model for marriage, a dominant man
paired with a subservient woman, same-sex couples offer an equality-
based alternative for patterning the marriage relationship. Recent
psychological research supports this notion, revealing that same-sex
couples "have a greater awareness of equality in a relationship than
148. See Chad Graham, Mary Cheney is Missing, THE ADVOCATE, Apr. 13, 2004, at 33.
Chrissy Gephardt, openly lesbian daughter of former House Minority Leader and
Democratic Presidential candidate, Dick Gephardt, states, "I have found that by be-
ing public, I have more of my privacy than you would imagine.... The cards are on
the table; there's nothing to hide."
149. Griswold v. Connecticut, 381 U.S. 479, 486 (1965).
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straight couples;"15 this awareness may explain why same-sex couples
exhibit more affection, humor, and honesty than their opposite-sex
counterparts. Expanding the zone into a more equal space and
providing such positive examples of true partnership would, as
MacKinnon advocates, "explode the private."1 52 Thus, granting the
protective zone of marital privacy to same-sex couples would not only
promote the equality of queer people by giving them the same rights
and privileges as heterosexuals, but it would also advance feminist
principles by transforming the marital zone into a more egalitarian
space.
Asserting the right to decisional privacy further advances the case
for legalizing same-sex marriage because it places the claim within the
Supreme Court's history for upholding such a right. The reproductive
rights cases in the mid-twentieth century, specifically Griswold and Roe,
interpreted the right of privacy as "the right to have the state not make
decisions about one's familial relationships-whether and whom to
marry, whether and when to have children." 5 ' By placing themselves in
this continuum, same-sex marriage advocates gain the gravity of prece-
dent and link their case to the evolution of the Supreme Court's
doctrine. As a natural progression of the Court's previous decisions,
same-sex marriage loses its taint as a threat to foundational truths. In-
stead, such unions will be recognized as protected by those very truths,
just as other personal decisions are protected. This recognition again
underscores the equality claim because it forces the government to re-
spect the familial decisions made by same-sex couples just as much as it
does the decisions made by opposite-sex couples.
By arguing for the right to relational privacy, the right to choose
and form one's own intimate relations with others, marriage advocates
would simultaneously decrease the general public's sexualization of
same-sex couples, thereby bolstering their claim for equality. As the
Bowers opinion illustrated, people often regard same-sex attraction and
relationships in terms of sexual acts, not romance, trust, or love. Profes-
sor Josephine Ross attributes this sexualization to the historic fact that
gay relationships existed outside marriage, and marriage is 'what makes
150. Press Release, University of Washington, Gayllesbian couples can reach heterosexuals
(Oct. 23, 2003), at http://www.queermarriage.com/index.php?content=showNews&
nID-28.
151. Id.
152. MAcKINNON, supra note 32, at 191.
153. William M. Hohengarten, Same-Sex Marriage and the Right of Privacy, 103 YALE L.J.
1495, 1524 (1994).
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sex legitimate.' ,,154 Such thinking leads to the reality that "gay love is
understood as the equivalent of gay sex, ' which in turn "is perceived
as profane, in contrast to marriage, which is perceived as sacred."' 56 In-
deed, one appeal of the right to marry to same-sex couples is the
relational privacy that it provides: "Many gay couples long for the pri-
vacy shield which will allow them to hold themselves out to the world as
a couple, without having to answer questions about what they do in bed
and how often."'57
Forcing the general populace to focus on relational privacy rights
for same-sex couples pushes the public to look beyond sexual acts and to
expose itself to the love, trust, and companionship that same-sex couples
share. Queer rights activists already have initiated this shift by promot-
ing positive media portrayals, such as the heartwarming image of Lyon
and Martin embracing after receiving a marriage license in San Fran-
cisco. Legal advocates need to follow this example, and, as seen from the
increasing inclusion of intimate details from plaintiffs' lives from the
Baker to the Goodridge briefs, it seems as if they have begun to do so.
Such work must continue because advancing this right to relational pri-
vacy supports the claim of equality among people of all sexualities.
Same-sex couples will never garner the same respect and rights as oppo-
site-sex couples unless their partnerships are viewed and understood as
deeply felt, loving, and interdependent as those shared by opposite-sex
partners. Perhaps complete equality in the eyes of the public will come
only after the legalization of same-sex marriages, as the current exclusion
sexualizes same-sex couples, but incorporating the relational privacy ar-
gument now will hasten the equality between heterosexual and
homosexual couples later.
Incorporating privacy-based arguments in order to promote equal-
ity not only advances the queer rights movement, but also enables the
feminist movement to resolve its troubled relationship with the privacy
doctrine. Reconciliation with the historically problematic doctrine is
necessary because such a significant proportion of the laws that dispar-
ately impact women, such as those concerning rape, domestic abuse,
and reproductive freedoms, are based upon it. It is unlikely that courts
will discard such powerful precedents in favor of equality-based rulings,
so the next-best alternative is to incorporate the positive attributes of the
154. Josephine Ross, Sex, Marriage and History: Analyzing the Continued Resistance to
Same-Sex Marriage, 55 SMU L. REv. 1657, 1659 (2002).
155. Id.
156. Id at 1659-60.
157. Id. at 1671.
2004]
MICHIGAN JOURNAL OF GENDER & LAW
privacy doctrine into equality-based cases. Reva Siegel encourages ex-
actly that, pushing advocates "to identify the peculiar strengths of
privacy discourse and to articulate privacy-based claims in ways that
complement, rather than contradict, equality-based arguments.. .. ""
Elizabeth Schneider also supports developing the privacy doctrine in
positive ways that feminists can rely upon, calling for a "right to privacy
which is not synonymous with the right to state noninterference with
actions within the family, but which recognizes the affirmative role that
privacy can play . 1.."'59 Thus, by transforming the marital zone, placing
same-sex marriage into the historical development of privacy, advancing
the precedents set by the Supreme Court, and emphasizing the relation-
ships shared by queer couples, the privacy doctrine not only fortifies the
case for same-sex marriage; it also invigorates and flexes equality-based
arguments.
V. CONCLUSION
Due to the influential feminist criticisms against the privacy doc-
trine and the devastating Bowers decision, same-sex marriage advocates
resisted formulating privacy-based arguments to support their cases for
equality. The movement responded by shifting its focus and transform-
ing notions of privacy into concepts of liberty. Such a transformation
proved costly, as the proponents gave up the substantial weight of his-
toric precedent and tolerated an erroneous perception of accepted
inferiority. Since the Supreme Court's decision in Lawrence, the queer
rights movement may recover those claims. By restoring zonal, rela-
tional, and decisional privacy rights to queer individuals and couples,
Lawrence enables advocates to rely upon those concepts when arguing
for marriage equality. The queer rights movement must do exactly that,
as inserting these essential notions of privacy into the case for legalizing
same-sex marriage will advance legal precedent and promote equality for
all couples, regardless of sex.
158. Siegel, supra note 63, at 69.
159. Schneider, supra note 48, at 998.
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